About swpatcusku

My own introduction to the realities of the patent system came in the 1980s, when my client, Sun Microsystems--then a small company--was accused by IBM of patent infringement. Threatening a massive lawsuit, IBM demanded a meeting to present its claims. Fourteen IBM lawyers and their assistants, all clad in the requisite dark blue suits, crowded into the largest conference room Sun had.

The chief blue suit orchestrated the presentation of the seven patents IBM claimed were infringed, the most prominent of which was IBM's notorious "fat lines" patent: To turn a thin line on a computer screen into a broad line, you go up and down an equal distance from the ends of the thin line and then connect the four points. You probably learned this technique for turning a line into a rectangle in seventh-grade geometry, and, doubtless, you believe it was devised by Euclid or some such 3,000-year-old thinker. Not according to the examiners of the USPTO, who awarded IBM a patent on the process.

After IBM's presentation, our turn came. As the Big Blue crew looked on (without a flicker of emotion), my colleagues--all of whom had both engineering and law degrees--took to the whiteboard with markers, methodically illustrating, dissecting, and demolishing IBM's claims. We used phrases like: "You must be kidding," and "You ought to be ashamed." But the IBM team showed no emotion, save outright indifference. Confidently, we proclaimed our conclusion: Only one of the seven IBM patents would be deemed valid by a court, and no rational court would find that Sun's technology infringed even that one.

An awkward silence ensued. The blue suits did not even confer among themselves. They just sat there, stonelike. Finally, the chief suit responded. "OK," he said, "maybe you don't infringe these seven patents. But we have 10,000 U.S. patents. Do you really want us to go back to Armonk [IBM headquarters in New York] and find seven patents you do infringe? Or do you want to make this easy and just pay us $20 million?" After a modest bit of negotiation, Sun cut IBM a check, and the blue suits went to the next company on their hit list.

In corporate America, this type of shakedown is repeated weekly. The patent as stimulant to invention has long since given way to the patent as blunt instrument for establishing an innovation stranglehold.

Imagine you own a small software company. You have written a powerful piece of software. This software is a creative combination of 1000 abstract rules (algorithms) and a lot of data. The rules take a few minutes or hours each to [re]invent, whereas developping and debugging the whole work took you 20 man-years. 900 of the rules were already known 20 years ago. 50 of the rules are now covered by patents. You own 3 of these patents. In order to obtain these patents, you had to rush to the patent office, disclose your business strategy and pay lawyer fees. IBM and Microsoft are meanwhile already turning your patented ideas into profit. You want them to stop? Their lawyer teams say you are infringing on 20-30 of their 50000 patents. So you reach a gentlemen's agreement: 3% of your annual sales revenues go to IBM, 2% to Microsoft, 2% .... Nonetheless, one day you enter the profit zone. You are now an attractive company. A patent agency approaches you. You are infringing on 2-3 of their patents, they say. Their claims are very broad. They want 100,000 EUR. Litigation could take 10 years and cost 1 million EUR. You pay. A month later, the next patent agent knocks on the door .... Before long you are broke. You seek protection from a big company. Microsoft offers to buy you for a symbolic fee. You accept. Under a copyright-only system, you would now be independent and rich. But by means of patents, Microsoft and others were able to steal your intellectual property.

Software is like other fields of engineering in many ways. But there is a fundamental difference: computer programs are built out of ideal mathematical objects. A program always does exactly what it says. You can build a castle in the air supported by a line of zero thickness, and it will stay up.

Physical machinery isn't so predictable, because physical objects are quirky. If a program says to count the numbers from one to a thousand, it will do exactly that. If you build the counter out of machinery, a belt might slip and count the number 58 twice, or a truck might go by outside and you'll skip 572. These problems make designing reliable physical machinery very hard.

When we programmers put a while statement inside an if statement, we don't have to worry about whether the while statement will run such a long time that it will burn out the if statement, or that it will rub against the if statement and wear it out. We don't have to worry that it will vibrate at the wrong speed and the if statement will resonate and crack. We don't have to worry about physical replacement of the broken if statement. We don't have to worry about whether the if statement can deliver enough current to the while statement without a voltage drop. There are many problems of hardware design that we don't have to worry about.

The result is that software is far easier to design, per component, than hardware. This is why designers today use software rather than hardware wherever they can. This is also why teams of a few people often develop computer programs of tremendous complexity.

People naively say to me, "If your program is innovative, then won't you get the patent?" This question assumes that one product goes with one patent.

In some fields, such as pharmaceuticals, patents often work that way. Software is at the opposite extreme: a typical patent covers many dissimilar programs and even an innovative program is likely to infringe many patents.

That's because a substantial program must combine a large number of different techniques, and implement many features. Even if a few are new inventions, that still leaves plenty that are not. Each technique or feature less than two decades old is likely to be patented already by someone else. Whether it is actually patented is a matter of luck.

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I've explained how patents impede progress. Do they also encourage it?

Patents may encourage a few people to look for new ideas to patent. This isn't a big help because we had plenty of innovation without patents. (Look at the journals and advertisements of 1980 and you'll see.) New ideas are not the limiting factor for progress in our field. The hard job in software is developing large systems.

People developing systems have new ideas from time to time. Naturally they use these ideas. Before patents, they published the ideas too, for kudos. As long as we have a lot of software development, we will have a steady flow of new published ideas.

The patent system impedes development. It makes us ask, for each design decision, "Will we get sued?" And the answer is a matter of luck. This leads to more expensive development and less of it.

With less development, programmers will have fewer ideas along the way. Patents can actually reduce the number of patentable ideas that are published.

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A decade ago, the field of software functioned without patents. Without patents, it produced innovations such as windows, virtual reality, spreadsheets, and networks. And because of the absence of patents, programmers could develop software using these innovations.

We did not ask for the change that was imposed on us. There is no doubt that software patents tie us in knots. If there's no clear and vital public need to tie us up in bureaucracy, untie us and let us get back to work!

Software is closer to math (non-patentable) than to chemistry (often cited as a success story of the patent system)

The american experience of software patents is a disaster. Before imitating them we should rather try to see if they won't agree to change their system.

In order to do that, it will be necessary to lobby the big american corporations.

The european software companies prefer to live with the pressure of having to improve constantly to the pressure of having to apply for patents, attack other companies and live with a constant risk of infringing on other companies' patents

Free software is an orthogonal problem. One could imagine applying for patents before publishing free software on the Net and thus creating inextricable legal situations.

The argument that the software startups are not able to access capital without patents is a lie. I have never encountered this kind of case.

My observation is that patents have not been a positive force in stimulating innovation at Cisco. Competition has been the motivator; bringing new products to market in a timely manner is critical. Everything we have done to create new products would have been done even if we could not obtain patents on the innovations and inventions contained in these products. I know this because no one has ever asked me "can we patent this?" before deciding whether to invest time and resources into product development.

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The time and money we spend on patent filings, prosecution, and maintenance, litigation and licensing could be better spent on product development and research leading to more innovation. But we are filing hundreds of patents each year for reasons unrelated to promoting or protecting innovation.

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Moreover, stockpiling patents does not really solve the problem of unintentional patent infringement through independent development. If we are accused of infringement by a patent holder who does not make and sell products, or who sells in much smaller volume than we do, our patents do not have sufficient value to the other party to deter a lawsuit or reduce the amount of money demanded by the other company. Thus, rather than rewarding innovation, the patent system penalizes innovative companies who successfully bring new products to the marketplace and it subsidizes or rewards those who fail to do so.

Like other companies operating in the telecommunications industry, we experience frequent litigation regarding patent and other intellectual property rights. Third parties have asserted, and in the future may assert, claims against us alleging that we infringe their intellectual property rights. Defending these claims may be expensive and divert the efforts of our management and technical personnel. If we do not succeed in defending these claims, we could be required to expend significant resources to develop non-infringing technology or to obtain licenses to the technology that is the subject of the litigation. In addition, third parties may attempt to appropriate the confidential information and proprietary technologies and processes used in our business, which we may be unable to prevent.

Our business and results of operations will be harmed if we are unable to acquire licenses for third party technologies on reasonable terms.

We remain dependent in part on third party license agreements which enable us to use third party technology to develop or produce our products. However, we cannot be certain that any such licenses will be available to us on commercially reasonably terms, if at all.

As I'm sure this committee is aware, there is a general animosity to pure software patents within and outside of the industry due to, one, the perceived allowance of what I'll diplomatically call overbroad patent claims, and two, the historically non-proprietary culture of the software engineering industry.

In sum, largely because the current patent system is poorly fashioned for the software design tool industry, the industry has evolved to minimize the impact that patents have on competition and has relied on other more market-oriented drivers of innovation. I believe this is a missed opportunity for accelerating technological and economic growth in the industry.

As a small company, one of the biggest risks I face is uncertainty in the marketplace. I can minimize my risk by understanding my competitor's products very well, by understanding my products very well, by understanding what the consumers and customers want. But I've found in the past year that I really can't understand the patent landscape and that I'm sitting with a nuclear bomb on top of my products that could go off at any point and cause me to simply not have a business anymore.

I recently took one of my lead developers, a gentleman who's widely considered a leader in his field -- he sits on both the MPEG and the ITU committees, is deeply involved with the entire intellectual property landscape around digital video -- and asked him to evaluate a particular patent that we've been hearing about in the marketplace.

We did a quick search on the USPTO website, which by the way is very useful, and uncovered no less than 120 patents that claim to be within the general scope of this particular patent, which was widely cited.

The poor guy spent the better part of five days examining all these different patents and came back to me saying, "I haven't the slightest idea whether or not we infringe on these patents, and frankly, they all seem to infringe on one another."

The end result being that I have no idea whether my product infringes on upwards of 120 different patents, all of which are held by large companies who could sue me without thinking about it.

The end result, much like Borland, I have now issued a directive that we reallocate roughly 20 to 35 percent of our developer's resources and sign on two separate law firms to increase our patent portfolio to be able to engage in the patent spew conflict. I think the concept here would be called saber rattling. I need to be able to say, "Yeah, I've got that patented too, so go away and leave me alone."

Let me make my position on the patentability of software clear. I believe that software per se should not be allowed patent protection. I take this position as the creator of software and as the beneficiary of the rewards that innovative software can bring in the marketplace. I do not take this position because I or my company are eager to steal the ideas of others in our industry. Adobe has built its business by creating new markets with new software. We take this position because it is the best policy for maintaining a healthy software industry, where innovation can prosper.

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For example, when we at Adobe founded a company on the concept of software to revolutionize the world of printing, we believed that there was no possibility of patenting our work. That belief did not stop us from creating that software, nor did it deter the savvy venture capitalists who helped us with the early investment. We have done very well despite our having no patents on our original work.

On the other hand, the emergence in recent years of patents on software has hurt Adobe and the industry. A "patent litigation tax" is one impediment to our financial health that our industry can ill-afford. Resources that could have been used to further innovation have been diverted to the patent problem. Engineers and scientists such as myself who could have been creating new software instead are working on analyzing patents, applying for patents and preparing defenses. Revenues are being sunk into legal costs instead of into research and development. It is clear to me that the Constitutional mandate to promote progress in the useful arts is not served by the issuance of patents on software.

Intouch is an e-business company that owns many patents and has been attacked with patents, including by Amazon. Joshua Kaplan is their president and CEO. These excerpts are from his statement at the FTC hearings of 2002:

There are patents that come out today with hundreds of claims, unintelligible to almost anyone except the people who drew them. And yet, people who violate them jeopardize sometimes a lifetime of investment or their division or their product. That system doesn't work well to spur innovation or carry out the constitutional mandate.

Indeed, for those of you who were here this morning and listened to the people in the software industry talk about how threatening this is to their businesses, as I see it, patents today are often entrenching the established at the expense of allowing the newcomer to come in. I question today whether a Steve Jobs could start an Apple or a Bill Gates could start a Microsoft in view of the web and thicket of patents that is out there.

Oracle Corporation opposes the patentability of software. The Company believes that existing copyright law and available trade secret protections, as opposed to patent law, are better suited to protecting computer software developments.

Patent law provides to inventors an exclusive right to new technology in return for publication of the technology. This is not appropriate for industries such as software development in which innovations occur rapidly, can be made without a substantial capital investment, and tend to be creative combinations of previously-known techniques.

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Unfortunately, as a defensive strategy, Oracle has been forced to protect itself by selectively applying for patents which will present the best opportunities for cross-licensing between Oracle and other companies who may allege patent infringement.

Although all that I "invented" were innovative, all utilized complex procedures and all were valued by those who paid millions to use what my innovative entrepreneurial risk created, it never occurred to me to patent them, and I could not have patented those "useful arts" if I had wanted to.

The fundamental question is: Do we want to permit the monopoly possession of everything that works like logical intellectual processes. I hope not.

The mind has always been sacrosanct. The claim that intellectual processes and logical procedures (that do not primarily manipulate devices) can be possessed and monopolized extends greed and avarice much too far. Algorithmic intellectual processes must remain unpatentable -- even when represented by binary coding in a computer; even when executed by the successor to the calculator.

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What frightens and infuriates so many of us about software patents is that they seek to monopolize our intellectual processes when their representation and performance is aided by a machine.

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Everything that is represented or performed by software is first a completely-detailed algorithmic intellectual process. There are no exceptions, other than by error.

Thus, I respectfully object to the title for these hearings -- "Software-Related Inventions" -- since you are not primarily concerned with gadgets that are controlled by software. The title illustrates an inappropriate and seriously-misleading bias. In fact, in more than a quarter-century as a computer professional and observer and writer in this industry, I don't recall ever hearing or reading such a phrase -- except in the context of legalistic claims for monopoly, where the claimants were trying to twist the tradition of patenting devices in order to monopolize the execution of intellectual processes.

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There is absolutely no evidence, whatsoever -- not a single iota -- that software patents have promoted or will promote progress.

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The company for which I am speaking, Autodesk, holds some number of software patents and has applied for others -- which, of course, remain secret under current U.S. law. However, all are defensive -- an infuriating waste of our technical talent and financial resources, made necessary only by the lawyer's invention of software patents.

Autodesk has faced at least 17 baseless patent claims made against it and has spent over a million dollars defending itself, with millions more certain to pour down the bottomless patent pit unless we halt this debacle. Fortunately -- unlike smaller software producers -- we have the financial and technical resources to rebuff such claims. We rebutted all but one of the claims, even before the patent-holders could file frivolous law-suits, and will litigate the remaining claim to conclusion. Note that your Office has issued at least 16 patents that we have successfully rebutted, and we never paid a penny in these attempted extortions that your Office assisted.

But it was an enormous waste of resources that could have better been invested in useful innovation. These unending baseless claims benefit patent lawyers, but they certainly do not promote progress.

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We offer two recommendations, the second having twelve parts -- so to speak, the 12 Apostles of Redress:

FIRST: Issue a finding that software, as I have defined it, implements intellectual processes that have no physical incarnation; processes that are exclusively analytical, intellectual, logical and algorithmic in nature. Use this finding plus the clearly-stated Constitutional intent, to declare that the Patent Office acted in error when it granted software patents. Declare that software patents monopolize intellectual and algorithmic processes, and also fail to fulfill the Constitutional mandate to promote progress -- that in fact, they clearly threaten it.

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SECOND: Until -- and only until -- software patents are definitively prohibited, reject or at least freeze all such applications that have not yet been granted, pending conclusive action on all of the following twelve recommendations:

REDRESS SERIOUS ERRORS OF PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATIONS: Issue a finding that there have been extensive and serious errors of judgment in a large percentage of software patents granted in the past, and immediately recall all software patents for re-review and possible revocation.

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Let us stand on each others' shoulders, rather than on each others' toes.

Because it is impossible to know what patent applications are in the application pipeline, it is entirely possible, even likely, to develop software which incorporates features that are the subject of another firm's patent application. Thus, there is no avoiding the risk of inadvertently finding oneself being accused of a patent infringement simply because no information was publicly available at the time which could have offered guidance of what to avoid.

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The period of patent protection, 17 years, no longer makes sense in an era when an entire generation of technology passes within a few years.

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If some future litigant is successful in upholding rights to one of these "bad" patents, it will require expensive and time-consuming litigation, whose outcome is frankly uncertain, to defend the rights of creators which should never have been challenged in the first place.

If people had understood how patents would be granted when most of today's ideas were invented and had taken out patents, the industry would be at a complete standstill today. ... The solution is patenting as much as we can. A future startup with no patents of its own will be forced to pay whatever price the giants choose to impose. That price might be high. Established companies have an interest in excluding future competitors.

Opera Software's position in the RF/RAND debate is that the fundamental standards for the Web must continue to be royalty free (RF). Therefore, we do not think W3C should describe procedures for RAND licensing. Doing so would help legitimize software patents which we think are harmful to the development of the Web. Also, software patents is largely an American concept not recognized in other parts of the world.

I do not look up any patents on principle, because (a) it's a horrible waste of time and (b) I don't want to know.

The fact is, technical people are better off not looking at patents. If you don't know what they cover and where they are, you won't be knowingly infringing on them. If somebody sues you, you change the algorithm or you just hire a hit-man to whack the stupid git.

Today I received a polite phone call from a fellow at Microsoft who works in the Windows Media group. He informed me that Microsoft has intellectual property rights on the ASF format and told me that, although the implementation was still illegal since it infringed on Microsoft patents. I have asked for the specific patent numbers, since I find patenting a file format a bit strange. At his request, and much to my own sadness, I have removed support for ASF in VirtualDub 1.3d, since I cannot risk a legal confrontation.)

I'm a professional software developer who early summer 1998 wrote a computer program that I decided to put on my homepage. The program turned out to be a tremendous success and was quickly distributed in millions of copies, obviously filling a need among many computer users. I quickly started to improve my program and release new versions. That same autumn I was contacted by a large company with a competing product, who claimed that my program infringed on certain patents they had been granted. Consulting SEPTO gave no reason to take infringement claims seriously since computer programs are not patentable as such, but in early 1999 my legal advisor explained that the legal uncertainty lately introduced by EPO would perhaps make the claims valid. That eventually forced me to stop making my program available.

Do you believe a corporation should have the right to control what computer programs I can write and publish?

I had to stop this project, because I cannot afford to pay an army of lawyers every time someone wants to impose conditions on my work. Software developpers react very sensitively to this kind of terrorism. If European politicians legalise software patents in Europe, that will work as a disinscentive to software production in Europe.

Is software now finally patentable?

Without doubt not yet.

In reality, the national and conventional rules are clear: they stipulate without ambiguity a principle of non-patentability of software. The game which is being played today consists in twisting these rules one way or another, e.g. by imagining to consider, as we have seen, the totality of software and hardware as a virtual machine which is potentially patentable (tomorrow ...). From that point on one can speak about software in patent language. The patents which may be obtained this way, by this channel or by another, however still do not have any value beyond what we lend to them - but of course it is possible that they will finally acquire a value simply through an informal consensus to stop discussing the question. In fact, the efficiency of this twisting of rules of law is largely dependent on whether this consensus evolves to take for granted -- against the rules of written law -- that we will play this game or not. This question is no longer a legal question in the strict sense of the term.

In this domain, we must base our judgement on the evolution of the written rules, i.e. whether the exclusions of non-patentable subject matter are deleted or not.

However in all cases the plan-conformant utilisation of controllable natural forces has been named as an essential precondition for asserting the technical character of an invention. As shown above, the inclusion of human mental forces as such into the realm of the natural forces, on whose utilisation in creating an innovation the technical character of that innovation is founded, would lead to the consequence that virtually all results of human mental activity, as far as they constitute an instruction for plan-conformant action and are causally overseeable, would have to be attributed a technical meaning. In doing so, we would however de facto give up the concept of the technical invention and extend the patent system to a vast field of achievements of the human mind whose essence and limits can neither be recognized nor overseen.

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It can furthermore be argued with good reasons that, given the unanimity with which the jurisdiction and the legal literature have always insisted on limiting the patent system to technical inventions, the above reasoning constitutes a theorem of customary patent law.

Whether we want to postulate such a theorem is however not essential for this discussion, because also from a purely objective point of view the concept of technical character seems to be the only usable criterion for delimiting inventions against other human mental achievements, for which patent protection is neither intended nor appropriate. If we gave up this delimitation, there would for example no longer be a secure possibility of distinguishing patentable achievements from achievements, for which the legislator has provided other means of protection, especially copyright protection. The system of German industrial property and copyright protection is however founded upon the basic assumption that for specific kinds of mental achievements different specially adapted protection regulations are in force, and that overlappings between these different protection rights need to be excluded as far as possible. The patent system is also not conceived as a reception basin, in which all otherwise not legally privileged mental achievements should find protection. It was on the contrary conceived as a special law for the protection of a delimited sphere of mental achievements, namely the technical ones, and it has always been understood and applied in this way.

Any attempt to attain the protection of mental achievements by means of extending the limits of the technical invention -- and thereby in fact giving up this concept -- leads onto a forbidden path. We must therefore insist that a pure rule of organisation and calculation, whose sole relation to the realm of technology consists in its usability for the normal operation of a known computer, does not deserve patent protection. Whether it can be awarded protection under some other regime, e.g. copyright or competition law, is outside the scope of our discussion.

/swpat/papers/bgh-dispo76/index.en.html

Automatic Data Processing (ADP) has today become an indispensable auxiliary tool in all domains of human society and will remain so in the future. It is ubiquitous. ... Its instrumental meaning, its auxiliary and ancillary function distinguish ADP from the ... individual fields of technology and liken it to such areas as enterprise administration, whose work results and methods ... are needed by all enterprises and for which therefore prima facie a need-to-keep-free is indicated.

A computer program may take various forms, e.g. an algorithm, a flow-chart or a series of coded instructions which can be recorded on a tape or other machine-readable record-medium, and can be regarded as a particular case of either a mathematical method or a presentation or information. If the contribution to the known art resides solely in a computer program then the subject matter is not patentable in whatever manner it may be presented in the claims. For example, a claim to a computer characterised by having the particular program stored in its memory or to a process for operating a computer under control of the program would be as objectionable as a claim to the program per se or the program when recorded on magnetic tape.

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In considering whether an invention is present, [the examiner] should disregard the form or kind of claim and concentrate on the content in order to identify the novel contribution which the alleged "invention" claimed makes to the known art. If this contribution does not constitute an invention, there is not patentable subject matter. This point is illustrated by the examples ... of different ways of claiming a computer program.

1. The limitation of patentability to the field of technology has as a concequence that important achievements with considerable economic value remain outside the scope of the patent system.

Thus the finding of the solution principle underlying a computer program, its implementation in a preparatory stage such as flow chart and finally the elaboration of the machine-readable program all require considerable efforts. The mental achievements accomplished therein are certainly not in general inferior to those in many patentworthy technical inventions. The economic value of data processing software is often considerable; ..

The Federal Court of Justice (FCJ/BGH) however refuses to drop the requirement of technical character.

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The FCJ/BGH also deems it impermissible to extend the scope of patentability by stretching the concept of technology.

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Also in legal writings the delimiting function of the requirement of technical character is mentioned.

If loosened, all teachings for mental activity become susceptible to patent protection; such a step would be objectionable due to freedom interests in the results and methods of microeconomics (for managment, organisation, accounting, financing, advertising, marketing etc), which are needed by all enterprises, and algorithms, which underly computer programs.

On the other hand there have been calls for review of the exclusion of non-technical activities, because this exclusion is said to have resulted from historical developments and meanwhile become obsolete.

2. As far as the law in force is concerned, the limitation of patentability to technical inventions, as reinforced by the FCJ, will have to remain in vigor. Apart from the explicit regulation in Art 1.2 of the German Patent Act and Art 52.2 EPC, also the existing institutional and organisational framework of the patent system, which is designed for the technical fields, does not allow us to evade these constraints by means of a change at the level of caselaw.

If a change at the level of written law is attempted, one would have to see to it that unoverseeably broad monopolies are avoided; thus at least discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical methods must remain excluded from patentability.

3. Contrastingly, in the area of non-technical instructions for action and of information processing the application of changes in practise would not necessarily be so sweeping that the scope of the exclusion right would become incalculable. Whether patentability in this field is recommendable depends on how the protection and rewarding interests are to be weighted in comparison to the freedom interests.

In general the freedom interests in this area will probably have greater weight than in the area of technical inventions, because exclusion rights for innovations which humans can use without harnessing forces of nature are to a lesser degree dependent on extra-human objects and therefore interfere in our freedom of action more directly and strongly. In particular, exclusion rights on commercial innovations could lead to considerable anti-competitive effects.

No sufficient argument for granting of patent protection can be found in the fact that the mental achievement to which it is to be accorded is otherwise not or not fully protected. On the contrary, the limits of the protection that is attainable under current law can be seen as indications that the freedom interests are of greater weight.

This is so far away from the wording of the law that a punishment of a patent granted on the basis of this illegal interpretation of the law conflicts with the legality principle of the German Basic Law (Art 103.2). It is a complete new formulation of the limit in paragraph 3 which no longer has anything in common with the law. The Technical Board of Appeal thereby clearly transgresses the limits of judicial activity. If you want to replace the wording "as such" by "without technical character", then you need to do that by amending the Convention using the required procedures. Caselaw can not achieve this.

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The claim [ of the Technical Board of Appeal in its IBM decision ] that the limitation of the exclusion of sofware from patentabilty to an exclusion of software as such in clause 3 was intended to enable the Board to promote technical progress by allowing patentability in acknowledgment of of the development of information technology, is not convincing. If the legislator had pursued such a purpose, he would right from the start not have provided an exclusion. The supposition [ by the TBA ] of an intention of the law which matches the desired result is certainly not a correct application of the teleological method of interpretation of law. It does however nicely demonstrate the willingness of the Technical Board of Appeal to substitute its own value judgements for the value judgements of the legislator.

The definition of the concept of invention, which is constitutionalized in the Nordic countries, contains the requirement that the invention must have a technical character. An exact definition of what this means can hardly be given, but within the concept lies definitely a requirement that an invention must be a solution of a problem by means of natural forces, i.e. by means of a causally determined use of natural matter and energy.

It was never the object of those laws to grant a monopoly for every trifling device, every shadow of a shade of an idea, which would naturally and spontaneously occur to any skilled mechanic or operator in the ordinary progress of manufactures. Such an indiscriminate creation of exclusive privileges tends rather to obstruct than to stimulate invention. It creates a class of speculative schemers who make it their business to watch the advancing wave of improvement, and gather its foam in the form of patented monopolies, which enable them to lay a heavy tax upon the industry of the country, without contributing anything to the real advancement of the arts. It embarrasses the honest pursuit of business with fears and apprehensions of concealed liens and unknown liabilities lawsuits and vexatious accountings for profits made in good faith.

Handbuch des Deutschen Patentsrechts, 1900

After jurisprudence has taken hold of any area treated by the law, it is up to science to develop it and all the other disciplines must resign; from now on it is the method of judicial thinking which must rule.

What are those qualifications? Is he a lawyer? Has he ever practiced law? Has he any law degree? ... Professor Hamilton ... prior to his Professorship in the Yale Law School was a Professor of Economics ... It does not appear that an affirmative answer could be given ... to any of the foregoing pertinent questions as to his qualifications to speak as an expert on the subject of patents or the patent system.

In fact, in my view, most patent lawyers -- most lawyers in general -- fit into the category "Pompous Pedagogues Pronouncing Patent Policies", to the extent they themselves unthinkingly spout pro-patent slogans. That is because most patent and IP and even other attorneys with an opinion on this issue mindlessly parrot the simpleminded economics with which they were propagandized in law school. Virtually every patent lawyer will reiterate the mantra that "we need patents to stimulate innovation," as if they have given deep and careful thought to this. Of course, virtually none of them have. They repeat what they have read in Supreme Court and CAFC (Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the primary federal appellate court dealing with patent law issues) opinions as if the positive law enunciated by government functionaries is some Holy Writ. It does not take a genius to figure out why most patent lawyers are in favor of the patent system; and it is not because they have really studied the matter and dispassionately concluded that society is better off with a patent system -- it is because they don't want to see the system that pays the mortgage for them eroded or abolished.

However, in response to pressure from the computer industry and trends emerging in the US, the European Patent Office reviewed its guidelines in 1985.

If computer implementation of non-technical processes were attributed a technical character merely because they display different specific characteristics, such as needing less computing time or storage space, the consequence of this would be that any computer implementation would have to be deemed to be of technical character. This is because any distinct process will have distinct implementation characteristics, that allow it to either save computing time or save storage space. These properties are, at least in the present case, not based on a technical achievement but are pre-determined by the chosen non-technical method. If the completion of such a task could be a sufficient reason to attribute technical character to a computer implementation, then every implementation of a non-technical method would have to be patentable; this however would run against the conclusion of the Federal Court of Justice that the legal exclusion of computer programs from patentability does not allow us to adopt an approach which would make any teaching that is framed in computer-oriented instructions patentable.

/swpat/papers/eubsa-swpat0202/index.en.html

We and our clients, mainly small software companies, are concerned about the proposed patent directive.

Recently we had to examin a patent conflict with a US patent and employed a highly specialised german patent law firm for this purpose.

The diagnosis of this firm (costing 4000,00 eur) was: for examining whether the US patent in question is being violated, the US patent attorney demanded pre-payment of 25,000.00 USD. Moreover, we were told that, as a result of this work, we would still not receive any definite information as to whether we are infringing or not. The answer would rather be something like "possibly ...", "it can not be excluded that ...". This was not to say that the US colleague was not competent. Rather, the german patent law took account of the common experience that in the field of bioinformatics reliable patent examinations are simply no longer feasible.

Highly tentative conclusions that can be made based on the literature suggest that stronger patent rights may create substantial problems in the telecommunication sector. First, strong patent rights may cause "patent portfolio race". In other words, companies may use patents primarily not to protect their technological invention itself but as instruments with which to trade in order to be able to negotiate access to external technologies. Given the observed entry deterrence strategies of the incumbents, stronger patent rights might provide with them new powerful weapons to defend monopolistic market positions.

Thus, stronger patent rights may hinder the development of effective competition in the telecommunication markets. Patentability of principles or ideas might further result in strategic patenting against compatibility. This could be particularly lethal to the content industry and further to the markets of the future generations of cellular mobile telephones and services. Currently avail able empirical evidence does not allow us to make definite conclusions. However, it suggests that strengthening of patent rights in the communication sector or extending patent protection to cover intellectual property currently protected by copyright involves great potential risks.

[...]

Developed and developing countries have historically provided that certain things do not constitute inventions for the purpose of patent protection. Included in these are those set out, for example, in Article 52 of the European Patent Convention (EPC):

1. discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical methods;
2. aesthetic creations;
3. schemes, rules and methods for performing mental acts, playing games or doing business, and programmes for computers;
4. presentations of information.

[...]

Even though subsequent EPO practice and jurisprudence have to some extent diluted the scope of these Articles,13 it would seem entirely reasonable for most developing countries to adopt this list of exclusions as a minimum.

[...]

Summary of Recommendations Relating to the Patent System

[...]

Exclude from patentability computer programs and business methods

Rechtlicher Ausgangspunkt für die Betrachtungen ist das Europäische Patentübereinkommen (EPÜ). Es wurde 1973 in München unterzeichnet und zählt 20 Vertragsstaaten. Europäische Patente werden generell für Erfindungen erteilt, die neu sind, auf erfinderischer Tätigkeit beruhen und gewerblich anwendbar sind. Expressis verbis ausgeschlossen sind gemäß Art. 52 Abs. 2 lit. c EPÜ jedoch "Programme für Datenverarbeitungsanlagen". Dennoch hat das Europäische Patentamt (EPA) vielfach Patente für technische Erfindungen erteilt, bei denen ein Computerprogramm verwendet wird. Das EPA geht nämlich davon aus, dass durch das EPÜ nicht alle Computerprogramme von der Patentierbarkeit ausgeschlossen sind und verweist auf den technischen Charakter³ einer Erfindung als wesentliche Voraussetzung für ihre Patentierbarkeit. Es unterscheidet folglich zwischen patentfähigen und nicht patentfähigen Computerprogrammen nach dem Kriterium der Technizität. Demnach ist ein rein abstraktes Werk ohne technischen Charakter nicht patentfähig; es muss ein zusätzlicher technischer Effekt (Mehreffekt) vorliegen. Das EPA schafft damit einen zusätzlichen Ausschlusstatbestand, der sich aus Wortlaut und Systematik des Art. 52 EPÜ nicht ergibt und nur mit einem Zirkelschluss begründet werden kann. Da der technische Charakter einer Erfindung Voraussetzung für ihre Patentierbarkeit ist und das EPÜ ein Patentierungsverbot für Computerprogramme enthält, muss es nach dem Verständnis des EPA Computerprogrammen ohne zusätzlichen technischen Effekt an der Technizität mangeln. Diese Auslegung zäumt das Pferd von hinten auf und ist mit dem Wortlaut des Art. 52 EPÜ nicht vereinbar.

[...]

Aus ökonomischer Sicht ist die Sinnhaftigkeit eines Patentschutzes danach zu beurteilen, ob dieser effiziente Anreize für die Investition in Forschung und Entwicklung setzt. Immaterielle Güter zeichnen sich dadurch aus, dass sie beliebig und kostenlos reproduzierbar sind und der Konsum von Wissen durch eine Person eine andere Person nicht daran hindert, dieses Wissen ebenfalls zu konsumieren. Der Einzelne wird deshalb nur so viel in die Produktion von Wissen investieren, wie er durch seinen eigenen Konsum rechtfertigen kann. Dies führt insgesamt zu einer ineffizient niedrigen Produktion von Wissen. Deshalb müssen Anreize, z.B. durch Patente, geschaffen werden, die die kostenintensive Produktion von Wissen in einem darüber hinausgehenden Maß bewirken. Ökonomisch gesehen wird bei einem Patent ein (ineffizientes) Monopol vorübergehend gewährt, um Produktionsanreize zu setzen. Das soeben dargestellte Modell ist weitgehend statisch. Kompliziertere Szenarien haben demgegenüber gezeigt, dass eine Verstärkung des Patentschutzes keineswegs zwingend zu einem vermehrten Forschungsaufwand führt. Im Gegensatz zur allgemeinen Annahme, dass weitgehender immaterialgüterrechtlicher Schutz zu höherer Investitionstätigkeit führt, vermochten Untersuchungen, die unter ähnlichen Bedingungen wie die der Softwareindustrie operiert⁶, eine generelle Zunahme der Ausgaben für Forschung und Entwicklung nicht nachzuweisen⁷. Empirische Studien über das Verhalten von kleinen und mittleren Unternehmen im Softwarebereich haben gezeigt, dass Patente für diese zu den am wenigsten effizienten Methoden des Investitionsschutzes zählen.

Vor diesem Hintergrund ist eine Ausdehnung des Patentschutzes auf Computerprogramme kritisch zu bewerten. Die Entwicklung von Software ist generell nicht kapitalintensiv, außerdem bestehen auf diesen Märkten bereits Netzeffekte, die wiederum Konzentrationstendenzen begünstigen. Durch Softwarepatente werden insbesondere für kleine und mittlere Unternehmen erhebliche Marktbarrieren entstehen. Open-Source-Softwareprodukte stellen ex definitione den Programmcode allen Interessierten zur Verfügung und könnten Patentschutz deshalb generell nicht in Anspruch nehmen. Die mit dem Patentschutz verbundene vorübergehende Monopolstellung eines Unternehmens ist geeignet, die Konzentrationstendenzen auf dem Markt für Softwareprodukte weiter zu verstärken und den Wettbewerb zu behindern.

Just because software hasn't experienced a cyber-Bhopal doesn't mean it won't ever happen. Indeed, the noxious clouds of litigation now gathering around e-commerce are renewing industry fears. ... There's ample historical evidence that overly broad patents have stifled innovation in emerging industries.

The effects of this substantial de facto broadening of patent subject matter to cover information inventions are as yet unclear. Because this expansion has occurred without any oversight from the legislative branch and takes patent law into uncharted territories, it would be worthwhile to study this phenomenon to ensure that the patent expansion is promoting the progress of science and the useful arts, as Congress intended.

There are many reasons to be concerned. ...

Since the benefits of the patent system are so tenuous and subtle and the overall benefit/cost ratio is considered to be negative, there is no economic justification for extending patent monopolies by lengthening the term, or by widening the grounds for either infringement, or patentability (for example, Plant Variety Rights or computer programs). However, in the light of our findings, there is considerable economic justification for policy action to reduce the negative effects of the patent system by stricter examination, by reducing the length of term and the scope of patent monopolies, and by action to deal with undesirable restrictive practices in patent licensing.

An historical awareness of the political economy of patent reform suggests that this task is not easy at the domestic policy level. This is basically because those who perceive they would lose by such reform are concentrated, powerful and active defenders of their interests. In contrast, those who would gain by patent reform are diffuse and hardly aware of their interest in the matter.

On the basis of the review and analysis contained in this first part of the working paper it is evident that Canada should give serious consideration to the possibility of abandoning the continued maintenance of a patent system in any form.

Bis zum Jahre 1873 war die Patentfrage heißumstrittenes Thema. Die Volkswirte hatten ihren Standpunkt mit Nachdruck vertreten, eifrig bemüht, die Öffentlichkeit und die Regierung zu überzeugen. Die Niederlage der Patentgegner - die in Regierungskreisen von vielen als ein Sieg der Juristen und anderer »Protektionisten« über die Mehrheit der Nationalökonomen angesehen wurde - veränderte den Charakter der volkswirtschaftlichen Erörterungen und Stellungnahmen zum Patentwesen. Die Flut von Büchern, Flugschriften und Artikeln über die wirtschaftlichen Grundlagen des Patentschutzes nahm ein Ende, die Nationalökonomen hatten das Interesse an der Patentfrage verloren und wandten sich anderen Problemen zu.

Up to the present, the regime for the international protection of patent rights has been developed primarily in the interests of patentees. The gains to be derived from an extension of the patent system have been stressed, but the concomitant increase in social costs has been seriously neglected.

Patents as an instrument to stimulate innovative activities appear to be of little relevance for small firms. It was found that no significant changes in R&D behavior would take place if the patent protection time were reduced or extended. Also, for large firms, the R&D behavior seems to be rather independent of the availability of patent protection. The survey showed that increased patent protection time is likely to provide, at most, a modest stimulus for R&D activities. Chemical, and particularly pharmaceutical, firms appear to be more sensitive to such changes.

It appears that patent policy is a very blunt instrument trying to solve a very delicate problem. Its bluntness derives largely from the narrowness of what patent breadth can depend on, namely the realized values of the technologies. As a consequence, the prospects for fine-tuning the patent system seem limited, which may be an argument for more public sponsorship of basic research.

Inventions do not belong in the category of intellectual property, because inventions are emanations of the current state of civilization and, thus, are common property. ... What the artist or poet create is always something quite individual and cannot simultaneously be created by anyone else in exact likeness. In the case of inventions, however, this is easily possible, and experience has taught us that one and the same invention can be made at the same time by two different persons; inventions are merely blossoms on the tree of civilization.

I believe the law is essentially deficient because it aims at a purpose which cannot be rationally achieved. It tries to parcel up a stream of creative thought into a serious of distinct claims, each of which constitutes the basis of a separately owned monopoly. But the growth of human knowledge cannot be divided up into such sharply circumscribed phases. Ideas usually develop shades of emphasis, and even when, from time to time, sparks of discovery flare up and suddenly reveal a new understanding, it usually appears on closer scrutiny that the new idea had at least been partly foreshadowed in previous speculations. Moreover, discovery and invention do not progress only along one sequence of thought, which perhaps could somehow be divided up into consecutive segments. Mental progress interacts at every stage with the whole network of human knowledge and draws at every moment on the most varied and diverse stimuli. Invention, and particularly modern invention which relies more and more on a systematic process of trial and error, is a drama enacted on a crowded stage. It may be possible to analyze its various scenes and acts, and to ascribe different degrees of merit to the participants; but it is not possible, in general, to attribute to any of them one decisive self-contained mental operation which can be formulated in a definitive claim.

.... the fairness of the patent laws is contested on the ground that they reward only those who put the finishing touch leading to practical utilization of achievements on many predecessors. These precursors go empty-handed although their contribution to the final result was often much more weighty than that of the patentee.

In the field of industrial patents in particular we shall have seriously to examine whether the award of a monopoly privilege is really the most appropriate and effective form of reward for the kind of risk bearing which investment in scientific research involves.

Expedients such as licenses of right, nevertheless, cannot repair the lack of theoretical principle behind the whole patent system. They can only serve to confine the evils of monopoly within the limits contemplated by the legislators; and, as I have endeavoured to show, the science of economics, as it stands today, furnishes no basis of justification for this enormous experiment in the encouragement of a particular activity by enabling monopolistic price control.

If I have seen further it is by standing on the shoulders of giants.

If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all others of exclusive property, it is the action of the thinking power called an idea, which an individual may exclusively possess as long as he keeps it to himself; but the moment it is divulged, it forces itself into the possession of everyone, and the receiver cannot dispossess himself of it...He who receives an idea from me, receives instructions himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me. That ideas should be spread from one to another over the globe, for the moral and mutual instruction of man, and improvement of his condition, seems to have been peculiarly and benevolently designed by nature ... Inventions then cannot, in nature, be a subject of property.

Im Grunde aber sind wir alle kollektive Wesen, wir mögen uns stellen wie wir wollen. Denn wie weniges haben und sind wir, das wir im reinsten Sinne unser Eigentum nennen! Wir müssen alle empfangen und lernen, sowohl von denen, die vor uns waren, als von denen, die mit uns sind. Selbst das größte Genie würde nicht weit kommen, wenn es alles seinem eigenen Inneren verdanken wollte. Das begreifen aber viele sehr gute Menschen nicht und tappen mit ihren Träumen von Originalität ein halbes Leben im Dunkeln. ... Es ist im Grunde auch alles Torheit, ob einer etwas aus sich habe oder ob er es von anderen habe; ob einer durch sich wirke oder ob er durch andere wirke: die Hauptsache ist, daß man ein großes Wollen habe und Geschick und Beharrlichkeit besitze, es auszuführen; ...

Patents once served to make research and development efforts pay off. Meanwhile, instead of serving innovation, the patent system has been twisted to become a means of mining the territory and neutralising unwanted innovators by sending them lawyers to screw them up at a moment where they are raising funds or looking for customers.

Although for the time being the scope of application of the Commission's proposal for a directive concerns computer-implemented inventions, to which are attached the classic, cumulative criteria limiting the field of application of patentability - which will not satisfy those in favour of purely and simply abolishing all limits on the field of application of patent law - the text is, nonetheless, a de facto acceptance and justification of the a posteriori drift of EPO jusriprudence. While at first glance the directive seems to advocate something less extreme than the pure and simple abolition of Article 52(2) of the EPC, which is what the EPO executive and some Council members want, it does nonetheless open the way to the future patentability of the entire software field, in particular by the admission that the "technical effect" can amount to the simple fact of a program running on a standard computer.

One may well wonder what the real objective of the Directive is, in particular given the explanatory memorandum, which begins with considerations about the need to protect the software industry against piracy, and in the documents appended to the Directive discusses almost exclusively software and the "software industry", whose influence on the proposal seems excessive yet entirely irrelevant, if the scope of application was really as limited as the Commission maintains.

Is it wise in today's world to widen the scope of patents, tools of the industrial age, to intellectual works which are immaterial, such as software, and to the results of running software on a computer? The reply is quite explicit and partisan in the presentation of the proposal for a directive and the impact assessment form. The narrow field of vision that has been adopted, based on the legal regime for patents as the sole motivation, without sufficient consideration of the economic factors, the impact on research or on European companies, which therefore lacks a view of the whole, is not consistent with the importance of the implications for society, for development and indeed for democracy (e-administration, education, citizens' information), which in the longterm is what is at stake.

The COR would draw the Commission's attention to the dangers that might arise from systematically relying on patents in the field of intellectual property, since patent protection is not universal. This applies mainly to the new technologies, and especially to information technologies and the life sciences, which are the subject of a detailed and heated debate.

In the case of software, the debates that have taken place since the 1970s in the main countries concerned have all led to a copyright system, although such a legal framework is not entirely suited to the sector's specific requirements. The European Directive of 1 January 1993 has shown some wisdom in encouraging interoperability among programmes so as to counteract the anti-competitive strategies of seeking a dominant position. But for several years now, US case law has been led into allowing the issuing of patents for software "components", a practice to which it had previously been hostile. And the US is putting increasing pressure on Europe to allow software patenting.

The stakes here are extremely high. Such a practice would threaten the progress of innovation in this industry, since it would lead to a compartmentalisation of knowledge and procedures, thereby preventing any interaction. The multitude of patents registered and granted in the USA include a very large number of procedures, or even algorithms. Many of them seem a long way from satisfying the criteria of novelty and originality which, theoretically, are the basis for issuing a patent.

If the issuing of patents for software became institutionalised, it would strengthen the dominant position of the biggest US market leaders in the sector. It would be a direct threat to the huge number of innovating smaller firms in Europe, the USA and in other countries. Finally, it would be a very severe handicap for the European software industry, which has a hard time remaining commercially competitive despite its high level of competence.

Among the questions of the future of the european software industry, the question of software patentability is of particular urgency, given the level of progression of the european work in this area and the policy of accomplished facts continuously pursued by the European Patent Office. Before installing a patent protection for software (as the USA demand from us), the Socialist Party believes that it is necessary to ascertain that it absense would really put the european software publishers at a disadvantage. The economic studies so far rather lead to believe that software patents are an arm in the hands of large enterprises which use them in order to block all inconvenient innovation or to restrict the development of free software. The american experience with software patents is particularly negative and merits reflexion.

The patent system doesn't seem to match the rhythm of innovation in the software sector: the time required for obtaining a patent is too long, as is the patent's validity term (20 years). The innovations in the software area are by their nature very close to mathematical discoveries: a new method of calculation, new algorithm or application of a known mathematical technique to a specific problem. How and where can we draw the line of separation between software processes and intellectual methods? We should also not forget that in our intellectual property system software already enjoys a significant legal protection.

Propositions

Therefore the negotiations at the European level require firm positions: thus, as long as no favorable effects on innovation can be seen, the socialists believe that:

• la brevetabilité du logiciel doit être refusée.
• les dérives constatées dans le fonctionnement de l'Office européen des brevets (OEB) combattues.

Among the questions of the future of the european software industry, the question of software patentability is of particular urgency, given the level of progression of the european work in this area and the policy of accomplished facts continuously pursued by the European Patent Office. Before installing a patent protection for software (as the USA demand from us), the Socialist Party believes that it is necessary to ascertain that it absense would really put the european software publishers at a disadvantage. The economic studies so far rather lead to believe that software patents are an arm in the hands of large enterprises which use them in order to block all inconvenient innovation or to restrict the development of free software. The american experience with software patents is particularly negative and merits reflexion.

The patent system doesn't seem to match the rhythm of innovation in the software sector: the time required for obtaining a patent is too long, as is the patent's validity term (20 years). The innovations in the software area are by their nature very close to mathematical discoveries: a new method of calculation, new algorithm or application of a known mathematical technique to a specific problem. How and where can we draw the line of separation between software processes and intellectual methods? We should also not forget that in our intellectual property system software already enjoys a significant legal protection.

Propositions

Therefore the negotiations at the European level require firm positions: thus, as long as no favorable effects on innovation can be seen, the socialists believe that:

• la brevetabilité du logiciel doit être refusée.
• les dérives constatées dans le fonctionnement de l'Office européen des brevets (OEB) combattues.

Software ... should continue to be protected by copyright rather than by patents.

The extension of the scope of patentability to software, an economic absurdity which would handicap our enterprises and stifle development in this sector, must be denied.

Le système de brevet s'est étendu depuis quelques années bien au-delà de son domaine de légitimité historique, économique et éthique. Cette extension est le résultat de décisions de jurisprudence de l'Office Européen des Brevets (OEB) qui sont parfois prises en contradiction avec l'esprit de la loi, telle qu'elle a été ratifiée par le législateur, et le plus souvent sans que les Etats signataires de la convention de Munich ne disposent des moyens de contrôler la portée économique et sociale de ces décisions. En particulier, je considère qu'en affirmant qu'un « programme d'ordinateur présentant des effets techniques » n'est pas « un programme d'ordinateur en tant que tel » et peut donc faire l'objet d'un brevet, l'Office des Européen des Brevets a clairement abusé de son pouvoir. L'OEB a en effet développé une jurisprudence manifestement contraire à la convention internationale qu'il est sensé appliquer, puisque tous les programmes d'ordinateurs ont un effet technique, comme l'ont très justement rappelé dès 1997 les experts européens en propriété industrielle réunis lors de la table ronde sur la « brevetabilité des logiciels » qui s'est tenue à Munich.

Cette extension incontrôlée du système de brevet dans le domaine du logiciel contribue à mettre en péril de façon croissante les entreprises informatiques européennes, les auteurs de logiciels libres et les principes fondamentaux qui ont permis l'essor de la société de l'information. Plus de 10,000 brevets logiciels ont été déposés depuis 10 ans à l'Office Européen des Brevets par des astuces de procédure cautionnées par l'OEB alors même que les guides distribués depuis 10 ans par les offices nationaux de brevets rappellent clairement que les programmes d'ordinateur ne peuvent être brevetés. Plus de 75% de ces brevets ont été déposés par des entreprises non-européennes. Nombre de ces brevets logiciels portent sur des méthodes de commerce électronique, voire des méthodes d'organisation des entreprises ou des méthodes éducatives.

Mais, comme il est rappelé dans les manuels de référence juridique tels que le Lamy Droit Informatique, ces brevets n'ont de valeur que celle que l'on veut bien leur accorder en raison de la contradiction manifeste qui existe aujourd'hui entre le droit positif et le système jurisprudentiel de l'OEB. En cas de contentieux, il n'est pas certain qu'un juge national accepterait la validité de ces brevets en raison de leur objet, manifestement contraires à l'esprit de la loi. Les détenteurs de brevets logiciels, de brevets sur le commerce électronique et de brevet Internet n'attendent donc qu'une chose pour attaquer les acteurs français et européens de la nouvelle économie: une révision de la convention de Munich qui supprimerait l'exception sur les programmes d'ordinateurs.

Aussi, je vous serais reconnaissant de bien vouloir user dans les consultations nationales, européennes ou mondiales à venir, de tous les moyens qui sont en votre pouvoir pour exiger:

1. de ne pas modifier en novembre 2000 l'article 52 de la convention de Munich, afin de ne pas activer le "cheval de troie" qui sommeille actuellement à l'OEB où de nombreux brevets Internet accordés abusivement à des entreprises non-européennes peuvent menacer du jour au lendemain la nouvelle économie française et européenne.
2. http://www.osslaw.org/
3. que les termes « technique », « application industrielle » et « programme en tant que tel » soient clarifiés de façon à ce que toute oeuvre, tout produit informationnel immatériel (y compris un logiciel sur un support d'information) ne soit ni admis dans le champ de la brevetabilité ni dans celui de la fourniture de moyen de contrefaçon de brevet.
4. que tout produit matériel, extension d'un produit informationnel immatériel (ex. un lecteur MP3) puisse être breveté à condition que soient satisfaits les critères de nouveauté, de technicité et d'application industrielle de ce produit matériel, considéré indépendamment des éléments logiciels qu'il exploite.
5. que soit lancé dans les plus brefs délais un débat ouvert et démocratique fondé sur des études scientifiques détaillées des effets économiques et sociaux induits par une extension du système des brevets à la société de l'information.
6. que soit mise en place une base de données de brevets complète, librement accessible sous forme de contenu libre et de logiciels libres, afin de donner aux PME les moyens de faire face aux risques de contentieux de brevets en Europe et dans le monde.

Aucune étude n'ayant été publiée par l'Office Européen des Brevets pour justifier l'intérêt économique de l'extension au logiciel de la brevetabilité, alors même que des économistes ont démontré que le système de brevet pouvait aboutir à une diminution de l'innovation dans l'économie du logiciel, il me semblerait également opportun de commanditer un audit de l'Office Européen des Brevets afin de déterminer les moyens de mieux contrôler les décisions de cet organisme et de s'assurer qu'elles sont bien conformes à l'intérêt général et au principe fondamental d'impartialité de la justice.

Gründer werden durch die Debatte über die mögliche Patentierbarkeit von Software und Geschäftsideen auch in Europa verunsichert. Hier muss schnell Klarheit geschaffen werden.

Computerprogramme "als solche" sind nach dem Europäischen Patent-Übereinkommen (EPÜ) nicht patentierbar. In den USA dagegen ist grundsätzlich alles menschengemachte patentierbar.

Bei Software-Entwicklern und in der Open-Source-Szene besteht erhebliche Verunsicherung, weil befürchtet wird, dass über die Novelle des EPÜ und eine angekündigte Richtlinie der Europäischen Kommission in Europa amerikanische Verhältnisse eingeführt werden sollen.

In den USA wird der Wettbewerb bereits erheblich auch durch die Patentierung von Geschäftsideen behindert. Viel zitiertes Beispiel ist das Patent von Amazon auf das one-click-Verfahren bei der Bestellung von Gütern im Internet.

Allerdings ist bereits in den letzten Jahren in Europa Software zunehmend als Bestandteil technischer Verfahren patentiert worden, denn: Technische Verfahren, die Computerprogramme beinhalten, sind patentierbar. Beispiel dafür ist eine computergesteuerte Werkzeugmaschine, die insgesamt patentierbar ist. Es mangelt derzeit an eingehenden ökonomischen Analysen, die die Wirkungen einer möglichen Patentierung von Software beschreiben. Wir sehen allerdings die Gefahr einer weiteren Verstärkung von Bürokratie mit dem Effekt, dass dringend notwendige Innovationen behindert werden.

Die Ermöglichung der Patentierung von Software würde darüber hinaus erhebliche technische und administrative Probleme schaffen: in der Zeit, die Anmeldung eines Patentes derzeit benötigt (derzeit 2 Jahre), ist das Patent längst veraltet. Die Dokumentation der Patente wäre extrem aufwendig. Kleine und mittlere Unternehmen würden durch die Patentierung benachteiligt: Große Firmen, die über die Ressourcen verfügen, die Patententwicklung zu verfolgen und Patente anzumelden könnten auf diese Weise zusätzliche Erträge erwirtschaften. Der Wettbewerb würde sich von der schnellen Umsetzung von Innovationen auf juristische Streitereien verlagern und der technische Fortschritt würde behindert werden. Das muss verhindert werden!

In technologiepolitischen Fachkreisen hört man immer wieder die Behauptung, das Patentsystem müsse auf gewisse Bereiche der Informationstechnik ausgeweitet werden, weil sonst deren Investitionen nicht genügend geschützt würden. Diese Behauptung wurde bisher allerdings immer nur als abstrakte Grundwahrheit weitergegeben und niemals anhand von Tatsachen der deutschen oder europäischen IT-Wirtschaft belegt.

Selbst wenn es gelänge, Bereiche der Informationstechnik zu finden, in denen Patente nachweislich vorteilhaft wirken oder gewirkt haben, müsste man noch immer untersuchen, ob eventuelle schädliche Nebenwirkungen der Patentierung diese Vorteile nicht überwiegen.

Aber während bei der Legislative noch vollkommene Unklarheit herrscht, schreitet die Judikative bereits zur Tat, gewährt Tausende von Softwarepatenten und drängt auf Änderung der Gesetzesregeln. Es ist daher höchste Zeit für uns als Gesetzgeber, uns um diese Fragen zu kümmern.

Die Vorentscheidung zugunsten von Softwarepatenten des Verwaltungsrates des Europäischen Patentamtes lässt aufhorchen. Hier wurde auf Verwaltungsebene eine Schlüsselentscheidung für die Schlüsseltechnologien des 21. Jahrhunderts vorbereitet. Das Thema Softwarepatente ist allerdings zu wichtig für unsere wirtschaftliche Zukunft, als dass es länger in den Hinterzimmern multinationaler Gremien und den juristischen Spezialzirkeln geführt werden darf.

Wir sollten sehr kritisch prüfen, ob wir auf dem schnellebigen Gebiet der Software einen exklusiven Patentschutz wollen. Denn die Patentierung von Software ist ein höchst zweischneidiges Unterfangen. Dem Schutzinteresse Einzelner steht die Innovationsfähigkeit der gesamten Branche gegenüber. Es sollte aufhorchen lassen, dass der zweitgrößte Softwarehersteller der Welt ORACLE sich aus diesem Grund massiv gegen Softwarepatente ausspricht. Insbesondere die in Europa starke und zukunftsträchtige Bewegung der freien Software (OpenSource wie LINUX) wäre durch Softwarepatente in ihren Grundfesten gefährdet.

Softwarepatente bergen die Gefahr in sich, daß die Großen der Branche dank Finanz und Personalkraft kleine und mittelständische Softwareschmieden mittels der Patentierung existenziell gefährden werden. Die Verfahren gegen Microsoft belegen aber deutlich, wie wichtig und schwierig Wettbewerb schon heute im Softwarebusiness ist. Die heftigen Debatten um Softwarepatente in den USA, aufgekommen durch die Patente für amazon.com, sollten Europa eine Mahnung sein. Wir sollten nicht um jeden Preis alles von Amerika übernehmen.

Europa wäre gut beraten, bei den Softwarepatenten an die meist klein- und mittelständische Struktur seiner Softwareindustrie zu denken. Es wirft kein gutes Licht auf das Gewicht die Bundesregierung, dass sie sich nicht im Verwaltungsrat gegen die Softwarepatentierung durchsetzen konnte. Die Märkte von morgen sind die Märkte von Ideen. Die Gedanken, auch die zu Software geronnenen, sollten aus liberaler Sicht weitestgehend frei bleiben.

UK E-Minister Patricia Hewitt 2001-03-12

Software genießt heute weltweit umfassenden Schutz durch das Urheberrecht. Damit ist den Herstellern und Programmierern ein starkes absolutes Recht verliehen, um ihre Interessen umfassend gegenüber Dritten wahrnehmen zu können. Indes kennt die US-amerikanische Rechtsordnung auch die Patentierbarkeit von Software. Im Gegensatz zum Urheberrecht schützt das Patent jedoch nicht das fertige Produkt, sondern dehnt den Schutz auf die Methode oder gar ein softwarebasierendes Geschäftsmodell aus. Die Entwicklung in den USA zeigt schon heute deutlich, dass die Patentierung von Software sich negativ auf die Entwicklung neuer Produkte und Geschäftsmodelle auswirken kann. Denn einzelne Softwarepatente können im Bereich der sogenannten Individualsoftware ganze Märkte blockieren.

Sowohl nach deutschem Patentrecht als auch nach dem Europäischen Patentübereinkommen sind Computerprogramme als solche derzeit nicht patentierbar. Die FDP spricht sich dafür aus, an dieser Rechtslage im Grundsatz festzuhalten.

supporting continued widespread innovation by resisting the wider application of patents in this area.

Statt der beabsichtigten generellen Ausdehnung des Patentschutzes für Software in Europa muss ein zweijähriges Moratorium beschlossen werden.

Auf der 'Diplomatischen Konferenz 2000' der Europäischen Patentämter ist vorgesehen, 'Programme für Datenverarbeitungsanlagen' aus der Ausnahmevorschrift Art. 52(2), europäisches Patentübereinkommen, zu streichen, und somit generell die Patentierung von Software zu ermöglichen.

In der Fachwelt gibt es gegen diese Absicht die berechtigte Befürchtung, dass durch den Revisionsvorschlag

• Monopolstellungen großer Softwarehäuser gestärkt und erweitert,
• kleine Softwareunternehmen und selbstständige Programmierer in ihrer Existenz bedroht und
• insgesamt der Fortschritt in der Softwareentwicklung deutlich gebremst würden.

Eine derart verheerende Entwicklung, die sich in den USA schon jetzt abzeichnet, darf in Europa nicht stattfinden. Deshalb muss vor einer weiteren Rechtssetzung für den Schutz von Software eine gründliche, öffentliche Diskussion von Fachwelt und Politik auf der Basis der folgenden Grundsätze geführt werden.

1. Ziele des Rechtsschutzes für Software:
   • Der Rechtsschutz muss Programmierer und Unternehmen in die Lage versetzen, die Früchte ihrer Arbeit zu ernten. Die finanzielle Entlohnung, die sich nur über den Rechtsschutz verwirklichen lässt, ist der wichtigste Anreiz für den Fortschritt in der Softwareprogrammierung und Anwendung.
   • Der Rechtsschutz darf aber nicht zur Stärkung von weltbeherrschenden Monopolen führen. Er muss den Wettbewerb fördern statt ihn zu behindern. Vor allem darf er keinesfalls kleine Softwareunternehmen und selbstständige Programmierer benachteiligen und in ihrer Existenz bedrohen.
2. Maßgeschneiderter Rechtsschutz für Software
   • Das Urheberrecht wurde zum Schutz von künstlerischen und schriftstellerischen Werken geschaffen. Es schützt auch Computerprogramme in ihrer Eigenschaft als Sprachwerke. Allerdings schützt das Urheberrecht die Software nur unzulänglich.
   • Die Patente wurden im beginnenden Industriezeitalter zum Schutz technischer Erfindungen eingeführt. In Ausgestaltung und Zeitdauer tragen sie den Erfordernissen der Wissensgesellschaft nur unzureichend Rechnung.
3. Software ist im Vergleich zu schriftstellerischen und künstlerischen Werken und zu technischen Erfindungen etwas völlig Neues und Andersartiges. Sie ist das elementare Hilfsmittel in der Informationsgesellschaft und dringt in immer neue Bereiche vor. Daher muss für sie ein eigenes, maßgeschneidertes Instrument des Rechtsschutzes geschaffen werden.

1. Noting that European Patent Office is planning to remove computer programs from the list of the things which can not be patented of in its next conference in end of November
2. Further noting the still existing great amount of unsolved problems in software patents like:
   • Abstract-logical nature of software, which is in conflict with the patent system's requirement for concreteness and physical substance
   • Inefficient long period of protection (20 years)
   • The lack of IT-expertise among the patent inspectors which would lead too wide patent claims to be accepted as has happened in the United States
   • The problem of anti-competitiveness; US software patents, if easily transferable to EU, could substantially narrow competition in the European Union, give dominant position to US corporations and have negative influence among european IT start-ups
   • The negative effect of patents to the interoperability of computer programs
3. Taking into consideration the strong opposition among small and medium size companies towards software patents in Europe
4. Having in mind the enormous economic importance of computer software industry and its need for effective protection for its investments
5. YEPP calls upon European political parties and the European Commission (DG XV) to take immediate actions to delay all development on software patents until the problems are correctly addressed
6. YEPP further calls for taking actions to strengthen the European software industry by improving the regulatory framework on combating software piracy

Der Text der EU-Richtlinie enthält vor allem im Vorspann und in den Erwägungsgründen viel moralische Lyrik, mit der Kritiker abgeschmettert und Parlamentariergewissen beschwichtigt werden können. Klare Grenzen und Definitionen fehlen. Schwammige oder in sich widersprüchliche Bestimmungen sorgen dafür, dass Rechtsnormen, wie sie das 1977 in Kraft getretene Europäische Patentübereinkommen vorgibt, systematisch ausgehöhlt werden können -- zum Beispiel das zentrale Prinzip der ärztlichen Therapiefreiheit. Nach Artikel 52,4 des Übereinkommens dürfen diagnostische, therapeutische und chirurgische Verfahren am menschlichen und tierischen Koerper nicht patentiert werden. Diesen Grundsatz beizubehalten, verspricht die Richtlinie in Erwägungsgrund 35, jedenfalls im Hinblick auf die Verfahren als ganzes. Teilschritte von Verfahren können jedoch sehr wohl patentiert werden. Nach dem Motto: Keine Tür darf dem Arzt zum Wohle der Patienten verschlossen sein, über die Nutzung der Türgriffe entscheidet aber der Patentinhaber.

Eine ähnliche juristische Spitzfindigkeit findet sich in dem für die EU-Richtlinie zentralen Artikel 5. Im ersten Abschnitt ist festgelegt, dass der menschliche Körper in allen Entwicklungsstadien nicht patentierbar ist, ebenso wenig wie die bloße Entdeckung eines seiner Bestandteile (Beispiel Gene). Im zweiten Abschnitt heisst es jedoch, dass Teile, die mit Hilfe eines technischen Verfahrens isoliert wurden, sehr wohl patentierbar sind. Wer sich mit der Regelung näher befasst, wie der Nationale Ethikrat der Dänen oder Kritiker in Frankreich, kommt nicht umhin festzustellen, dass bei Genen und Teilsequenzen von Genen die vermeintliche Ausnahme die Regel ist. Gene liegen immer isoliert vor, wenn sie entschlüsselt werden.

Mit der Vergabe der 20-jährigen Monopole auf die Nutzung von Software-Ideen, so Däubler-Gmelin, seien erhebliche Probleme für die Ökonomie und die Sicherheit der Informationsgesellschaft verbunden, die ``erst einmal gründlich und breit diskutiert werden müssen''. [...]

Man könne schließlich eine solch zentrale Frage der Wirtschaftspolitik "nicht von Malta und Liechtenstein bestimmen lassen", erklärt ein Ministerialer. Notfalls könne man auch das Abkommen insgesamt platzen lassen und innerhalb der EU eine eigene Patentpolitik entwickeln.

Vehement hat sich Bundesjustizministerin Herta Däubler-Gmelin auf der Hannover Messe gegen Vorschläge der EU ausgesprochen, die Patentierbarkeit von Software generell zu erlauben. Mitte dieses Monats will EU-Kommissar Frits Bolkenstein der europäischen Kommission eine neue Richtlinie zur Patentierung von Computerprogrammen vorlegen. In dieser Richtlinie werden sämtliche Computerprogramme als patentierbar erklärt. Justizministerin Herta Däubler-Gmelin spricht sich gegenüber der Computer Zeitung deutlich gegen diesen Vorschlag aus und fordert die Beibehaltung der jetzigen Regelung, die Softwarepatente nur als Bestandteil eines technischen Verfahrens erlaubt.

Our key principle is that patents should be for technological innovations. So a program for a new machine tool should be patentable but a non-technological innovation, such as grammar-checking software for a word-processor, should not be.

V. Strategic Considerations

Recently my firm had to explore the patent situation world-wide for one the major banks. All existing U.S. patents and all published European patent documents have been searched regarding any potential risk for the banking business. The search was performed on the basis of a profile combining both the leading banks, service providers in that field and also key-terms relevant in the field of banking. The search revealed more than 5000 patent documents which could possibly have an impact on the activities of the bank. The next step will be to evaluate those patents regarding scope of protection and the possible relevancy. The task being a list of patents which might be infringed by the bank's business. Possible counter-measures are envisaged in a next step (oppositions, negotiations etc.).

It is assumed that the evaluation of all patents will need two or three patent experts, combined with two or three IT-experts from the bank itself and a time period of three to six months. This is the "defensive" measure. As an "offensive" measure it is advisable that banks start filing patent applications wherever possible and promising. Of course, the liberal practice in the U.S. requires to file almost any business method for patent. These business methods are always implemented by a computer (I have not seen any other example). This computer implementation in most cases gives the opportunity to look for some sort of a "technical effect" or "technical consideration" or "technical problem" etc. which might help to obtain a European patent, in the long run. When studying a business method computer software program it turns out that in most cases that program includes at least one aspect (feature) which might qualify under the European standards as "technical". It is an advisable measure for any bank these days to try to develop a patent portfolio in order to have at least some arguments in hand when approached by others for patent infringement.

We want to build picket fences around the technologies that we think are most important for the future.

You get value from patents in two ways: through fees, and through licensing negotiations that give IBM access to other patents. The IBM patent portfolio gains us the freedom to do what we need to do through cross-licensing--it gives us access to the inventions of others that are the key to rapid innovation. Access is far more valuable to IBM than the fees it receives from its 9,000 active patents. There's no direct calculation of this value, but it's many times larger than the fee income, perhaps an order of magnitude larger.

Because in the system of free world trade products can in many places be manufactured cheaper than in the advanced countries, the economic success of European enterprises increasingly depends on whether they can succede in obtaining competitive advantages by innovations. This incentive to innovate can however only exist if a legal protection of the inventions is assured. If the inventions are legally protected, they can, as "intellectual property", form a major part of the assets of a company. The need for lawyers, scientists and engineers with knowledge in patent law is increasing accordingly.