
Software Patents > Reviews > Digital Dilemma 2000 > Bessen & H 2003/05 > Bessen & M 2000 > Waterson & I 1998
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Waterson & Ireland: An Auction Model of Intellectual Property Protection: Patent vs Copyright

Michael Waterson and Norman Ireland, economists from the University of Warwick, constructs a parametrised game model to simulate the innovation game under a regime of pharma patents, plant variety protection, software patents and software copyright as well as many other situations. The model contains some simplifications that work in favor of patents. E.g. it does not consider monopoly-based welfare losses, which are at the center of many economic analyses of the patent system. Instead its social welfare is simply the aggretation of the potential players expected utilities. Also it does not consider the need for modularity and interoperability in the software world. Yet, the model depicts many observable phenomena quite well, and it leads to the conclusion that software patents have a negative effect on innovation while pharma patents and software copyright has a positive effect.

title:: Waterson & Ireland: An Auction Model of Intellectual Property Protection: Patent vs Copyright
source:: AES AES N 49/50 -- 1998

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