This Expert Opinion, ordered by the German Ministery of Economics, largely states the opinion of Axel Horns, patent lawyer in Munich, which he had alread exposed in almost identical form in previous articles and discussions. Like many of his colleagues, Horns interprets Art 52 EPC as an obnoxious misconception of the legislator. He eloquently avoids to understand its underlying systematic teaching about the technical invention. The software patent critics, who base much of their legal opinion on this systematic understanding of the current law, are labeled as "ideologues". Even the legislator is, against all historical facts, presented as a moron: Art 52(2(3) EPC) does not either mention or imply a syntactic or semantic unit called "computer programs as such". Just as mathematical methods, construction plans, "programs for computers" etc are not patentable as such, the historical myths of Horns are as such hardly worthy of any serious discussion. However they could aspire to certain honours in the context of a satire. Instead of analysing the details of this expert opinion, we will first present here a few extracts from our discussions with Axel Horns. In order to understand more deeply the background of this discussion, you may want to browse through the legal literure on the notion of technical invention. Horns keeps silent on this literature, mentions at best helpful fragments of the ABS decision and occasionally insinuates that once upon a time there was an "outdated" concept of technical invention and and an "old core theory" (i.e. the doctrine that a claim must be stripped of its "linguistic clothing" and that not the claim wording but the "inventive core", i.e. the problem solution in return for whose disclosure a monopoly is granted, must be an application of physical causality). Unfortunately the reasoning of Horns itself could be seen as "outdated" compared to the concept of technical invention and the "core theory". The Horns teaching lacks novelty compared to the reasoning of a whole range of theorists and court decisions of the 50s, 60s and 70s, that were, after a long argumenative back and forth, overruled by the landmark decisions in 1973, 1976 in Germany as well as parallel decisions in France and other European countries. The European Patent Convention (EPC) was born in this context, and its underlying concept of technical invention received a forceful theoretical underpinning by Gert Kolle and other scholars of the time, which again found its way back into BGH caselaw, which speaks a clear a language against software patents, just as the examination guidelines of the EPO. The LuHoGe expert opinion uses a lot of space on known personal opinions that have been forcefully rejected. One of these is Robert Gehrings statement in favor of a novelty grace period, which echoes, which echoes a similar demand of the universitarian patent lobby. Another is Prof. Lutterbecks frequently reiterated claim that copyright is adequate to Goethe's Faust but not to software. This claim is no longer state of the art, because copyright has been adapted to software through several rounds of revision in the 80s and 90s, and it contradicts the daily practise and widespread acceptance of copyright in all parts of the software community. The fact that software functionalities cannot be appropriated by means of coypright does not indicate that they need to be appropriated by means of patents. It could just as well indicate that they should not be appropriatable at all, as has been frequently pointed out by the patent law literature. Lutterbeck on the one hand tries to justify the expansion of the patent system into the field of abstract functional ideas and on the other hand cites Machlup and others to give a negative judgement on the patent system as a whole, including the field of concrete physical causality, where it has caused much less trouble. This way Lutterbeck manages to appear as a critic of the patent system while at the same time condoning patent inflation and evading the questions he was asked by the ministery of economics. On the whole the experience with this and other "expert opinions" leads to the question, whether such opinions really justify the privilege of a governmental study order. Wouldn't it be better if the responsible governmental agencies could actively participate in a well organised public discussion through means such as mailing lists or newsgroups, and within that framework sponsor conferences, pay for more systematic presentations of information sources as well as research on specific factual questions? The question of this study "patents vs open source, a contradiction?" was apparently not worth asking. Our consultation questions of the Federal Parliament could provide some inspiration as to what might be.